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SOCIAL WELFARE - AN EMERGING DOCTRINE OF STATUTORY ENTITLEMENT
I. Introduction
A great number of recent cases' have dealt with the constitutionality of
durational residence requirements conditioning eligibility for financial assistance
under various categorical assistance programs, most principal of which is the
Aid to Families With Dependent Children Program [hereinafter AFDC]. The
issues presented by these cases were two: first, whether exclusion of a welfare
applicant for failure to satisfy a durational residence requirement violates the
applicant's right of interstate travel; and, second, whether such an exclusion
was a denial of equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment.2
These cases raised in a concrete legal context what one authority has called
"the foremost political and legal problem of our time: how can the modem
service state meet social security demands consistently with individual freedom
and social justice? ' 3 In the practical sense, this problem presents two funda-
mental questions concerning our public welfare system: first, what is the nature
of the welfare recipient's interest in the assistance he receives and, second, what
conditions may be imposed by the legislature upon the welfare recipient's
eligibility for public assistance to further the public interest. It is the purpose
of this Note to explore these questions in terms of the existing legal structures
and the developing case law.
In the solution of these questions both political and legal issues must be
dealt with, and thus their solution is made extremely complex. Before any real
analysis of the problems presented by our public welfare system can be made, it
is necessary to distinguish between the political and legal issues which are part
of the overall problem. The political issues deal with the wisdom of the policies
that have been adopted to challenge the problems of poverty and the policies
that ought to be adopted to deal more adequately and justly with these problems.
The legal issues, on the other hand, deal with the extent of the legislature's
1 See, e.g., Robertson v. Ott, 284 F. Supp. 735 (D. Mass. 1968); Waggoner v. Rosenn,
286 F. Supp. 275 (M.D. Pa. 1968); Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, (D. Conn. 1967),
prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S. 1032 (Jan. 15, 1968); Green v. Department of Public Welfare,
270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967); Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967), prob.juris. noted, sub nom. Washington v. Harrell, 390 U.S. 940 (Mar. 4, 1968) ; Smith v. Reynolds,
277 F. Supp. 65 "(E.D. Pa. 1967), prob. juris. noted, 390 U.S. 940 (Mar. 4, 1968); Ramos
v. Health & Social Serv. Bd., 276 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Wis. 1967). Additional pending cases
are listed in Brief for Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law as Amicus Curiae at 47,
Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967).
2 The argument that a durational residence requirement violates the right of interstate
travel is based principally on Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), which held un-
constitutional a statute making it a crime to knowingly transport an indigent into the state.
The equal protection argument is that a durational residence requirement is not reasonably
related to the purposes of public assistance, relying on the application of the reasonable
relationship test stated in McLaughin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). For further ex-
planation of these fundamental issues, see generally Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence
Tests for General and Categorical Assistance Programs, 54 CALIF. L. Rxv. 567 (1966) and
Comment, The Constitutionality of Residence Requirements For State Welfare Recipients, 63
Nw. U. L. Rav. 351 (1968).
3 Cowan, The Impact of Social Security on the Philosophy of Law: The Protection 'of
Interests Based on Group Membership, 11 RUTGERS L. Rav. 688 (1957).
603
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
power to provide financial assistance to the needy; and, more specifically, they
develop the limitations the law imposes on this power to include certain classes
of the needy in a given welfare program, while excluding others, and, in general,
to regulate eligibility for assistance.
Unfortunately, no clear distinction has been made by counsel in many of
the recent cases between arguments going to the inadequacies of the present
welfare system and arguments going to the nature of the legal rights and duties
of the individual and. his government under the presently existing programs.'
However, this distinction between wisdom and power has been recognized by
some of the recent judicial opinions' and has a firm basis in past decisions deal-
ing with similar social legislation.'
On the basis of this distinction between the political issues and the legal
issues that must arise in any consideration of our public welfare system, the
functions of the legislative branch of government and the legal system are clear.
The legislature's function, after considering all the relevant information and pos-
sible approaches, is to formulate policy and establish legal structures to deal with
the problems of poverty; the legal system's function is to determine, in the various
litigated situations which arise, whether the legislature has overstepped its legal
power to establish, regulate and condition financial assistance to the needy. The
wisdom of a particular statutory provision or the policy judgment which it rep-
resents are not legal issues, and arguments dealing with these must be addressed
to the legislature rather than to the courts.'
It must be noted, however, that this distinction between the political and
the legal does not mean that the courts are divorced from determining questions
of policy in the area of welfare legislation. It is important to remember that
the legislative policy which underlies our public welfare laws is of the highest
relevance to the courts as a guide to the interpretation and enforcement of the
various statutes.' As will be seen later, the purpose of a particular welfare statute
- the underlying policy it expresses - is the basis of perhaps the most significant
legal limit on the power of the legislature in the area of public welfare.'
4 See, e.g., Brief for Nat. Fed'n of Blind as Amicus Curiae at 43, Washington v. Harrell,
prob. juris. noted, 390 U.S. 940 (Mar. 4, 1968) which concluded:
There is no dearth of indications that perhaps no time in our history has rivaled
the present for urgency to take all feasible steps to relieve the misery of the poor.
The elimination of durational residence requirements in welfare legislation would be
a milestone in that direction, and fortunately, it is as legally required as socially
wise. The majority of judges in several lower courts have begun the laudable work.
It is now for this court to complete it.
See also Brief for Appellees at 10-18, Reynolds v. Smith, prob. juris. noted, 390 U.S. 940
(Mar. 4, 1968); Brief for Appellee at 4-9, Shapiro v. Thompson, prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S.
1032 (Jan. 15, 1968).
5 See, e.g., Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65, 68 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Harrell v. Tobriner,
279 F. Supp. 22, 32 (D.D.C. 1967) (Holtzoff, J., dissenting); Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F.
Supp. 331, 338 (D. Conn. 1967) (Clarie, J., dissenting).
6 See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960); Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Supp.
853, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 37 U.S.L.W. 3242 (Jan. 14, 1969).
7 See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
8 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325-26 (1968).
9 See notes 128-47 infra and accompanying text.
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II. The Statutory Foundatior
Any study of the- system" of public welfare in the United States must begin
with mention of the statutes which provide for financial assistance -and other
services to the needy, sirice there is no recognized common law or constitutional
obligation upon the government to provide such assistance. Any obligatiofi -
legal, not moral - requiring the government to provide such assistance is im-
posed by statute. ° Consequently, the fundamental legal questions 'presented by
the public welfare system must be considered in the context of the statutory
structure imposing these governmental obligations
A. The Elizabethan- Roots
The present American system of, welfare legislation finds its roots
in the early poor laws of England, generally refeired to as the Elizabethan Poor
Laws. The English poor laws began developing in the thirteenth century" and
reached full development in 1601 with the passage of the Elizabethan Poor
Laws,' and in 1662 with the passage of the Settlement Act.'3
There were three essential principles of the Elizabethan Poor Laws' 4 and,
to a surprising degree, they have carried over into the present American system
of public assistance. 5 The first principle was that of local responsibility. The
parish, the basic unit of English local government, was entrusted with the re-
sponsibility of administering the system-by obtaining the necessary funds through
taxation of the members of the parish, determining the eligibility of persons for
assistance, and distributing the funds to the needy.' The two remaining principles
served to place limits on the parish's responsibility. The first of these was the
principle of settlement and removal.' Under this principle, the parish had no
responsibility to care for a needy person if he was not "settled" in the community,
and this required a significant contact with the parish both in terms of time
and economics. Furthermore, if a person became indigent while he was in a
parish in which he did not have settlement, he was subject to removal to the
parish in which he last had settlement.' The present-day analogue of settle-
ment and removal is the durational residence requirement about which-most
10 See County of Merrimack v. Town of Derry, 107 N.H. .212, 213, 219 A.2d 703, 705
(1966); Mansfield Gen. Hosp. v. Board of County Commr's, 170 Ohio St. 486, 488, 166
N.E.2d 244, 226 (1960); City of Champaign v. City of Champaign Township, 16 Ill. 2d
58, 60-61, 156 N.E.2d 543, 545 (1959); Collins v. State Bd. of Social Welfare, 248 Ia.
369, 375, 81 N.W.2d 4, 7 (1957).
11 The -poor law system originated out of the shortage of labor caused by the Great Plague
of 1348 which led to government control over the labor supply and prohibition of'the giving
of alms to able-bodied beggars in 1349 under the Ordinances of Labor. For further discussion
of this development, see Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law,
43 CALIF. L. REv. 174, 178-81 (1955).
12 Id. at 181.
13 For a full discussion of the historical development of this Act, see id. at 181-98.
14 Id. at 178.
15 Se.e -tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its, Origin, Development, and
Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REv. 257, 296, 939 (1964); Riesenfeld, supra note-il, at 201-32.
16 Riesenfeld, supra note 11, at 178, quoting from 43 Eliz., ch. 2 (1601).
17 Id. at 178.
18 Sex id. at 181-98.
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of the recent litigation is concerned. 9 The second of these limiting principles
was the principle of primary family responsibility. ° Under the Elizabethan Poor
Laws, both the parents and the grandparents of the indigent person were held
primarily responsible for the person's maintenance and were liable to the gov-
ernment for any assistance provided.2 This characteristic endures in the present
welfare system of the United States.
22
The Elizabethan Poor Laws are relevant to the contemporary legal prob-
lems of public welfare for two reasons: first, they constitute the initial recogni-
tion by Anglo-American government of its responsibility to provide financial
assistance to the needy,2" and, second, their basic structure has served as the
model for most American welfare statutes. At least until very recently, the
poor law system has endured and dominated most of the American responses
to the problems of poverty. Its influence can easily be seen in the structure of
most state categorical and general assistance welfare legislation" and in the
fact that most of the recent litigation deals with the constitutionality of pro-
visions that are based on Elizabethan concepts.
B. The Social Security Act
The Social Security Act of 19352" presents a fundamental change in the
19 The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1964) allows the states to set the
following requirements:
The Secretary shall approve any plan which fulfills the conditions specified in
subsection (a) of this section, except that he shall not approve any plan which
imposes as a condition of eligibility for aid to families with dependent children, a
residence requirement which denies aid with respect to any child residing in the
State (1) who has resided in the State for one year immediately preceding the
application for such aid, or (2) who was born within one year immediately preceding
the application, if the parent or other relative with whom the child is living has
resided in the State for one year immediately preceding the birth.
The litigation arising from these requirements is listed in note 1 supra.
20 See Riesenfeld, supra note 11, at 178.
21 The poor laws of 1597-98 established a mutual duty of support between parents and
legitimate children, which was extended to grandparents in 43 Eliz., ch. 2, § 7 (1601). See
id. at 199.
22 See State v. Griffiths, 152 Conn. 48, 203 A.2d 144, 149 (1964), which upheld the
constitutionality of a statute making grandparents of dependent children under AFDC liable
for their support. But see Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner. 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388
P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964), vacated and remanded for clarification, 380 U.S. 194
(1965) (holding that an adult child cannot be held liable for the institutional care provided
his parent by the state).
23 In commenting on the significance of the Elizabethan Poor Laws, Professor tenBroek
said:
The central concept and great achievement of the Elizabethan poor law was
the firm establishment of the principle of public responsibility to maintain the
destitute. Through it, the final step was taken, permanently shifting a part of the
burden to relieve economic distress from the ecclesiastical, private, and voluntary to
the civil, public, and compulsory. The assumption of responsibility, moreover, was
made by the nation and its application was nationwide. tenBroek, supra note 15,
at 262.
24 See id. at 941.
25 For example, the welfare laws of Connecticut provide that the state's general support
program is to be administered by the towns and financed through local tax revenue. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-273 to -91 (Supp. 1968). CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-320 to -26
(Supp. 1968) impose the primary responsibility for the support of destitute persons on their
relatives. Connecticut repealed its settlement statutes in 1961. See 1961 Conn. Pub. Act 425,§ 6.
26 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396g (1964), as amended (U.S.C.A. Supp. 1969), particularly
Subchapters IV [Grants to States For Aid and Services to Needy Families With Children
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American approach to the problems of poverty by bringing the federal govern-
ment into an area heretofore dominated by the states. While the Act deals pri-
marily with the problems of old age and unemployment through the Old Age
Assistance Program and the Unemployment Compensation Program, largely fi-
nanced by beneficiary contributions during periods of employment, the Act also
provides for grants-in-aid to the states to enable them to assist certain categories
of needy persons on a non-contributory basis. Under these categorical assistance
programs, such as AFDC, the responsibility for the administration of the pro-
gram is entrusted to the states, while the cost of the programs are met by both
state and federal contributions; the states are, however, required to meet min-
imum federal standards to participate." Under the concept of categorical as-
sistance, financial assistance, as well as other benefits, are provided to needy per-
sons who fall into a specified category, the requirements of which are carefully
defined by statute. For example, Subchapter IV of the Act, entitled "Grants
To States For Aid and Services To Needy Families With Children," sets up the
category "dependent children" and provides for the granting of federal funds
to the states to aid needy children and their families who fall within this general
category; additionally, these individuals must satisfy any other conditions - with-
in limits set by the Act - the states choose to place on eligibility for assistance."
In this way, federal-state categorical assistance programs supplement the tradi-
tional poor relief or general assistance which is otherwise generally made avail-
able on the local level, and together, these programs provide for the eligible
recipient at least the bare necessities required for his subsistence. However,
while categorical assistance encompasses the purpose of general assistance - the
maintenance of the needy - its purposes, as expressed by the Act, go beyond
this and include enabling the poor to become independent and self-supporting."0
It is with this expressed hope of eliminating the need for assistance that the
Social Security Act significantly transcends its Elizabethan antecedents.
C. Recent Developments
More recently, greater emphasis has been placed on direct efforts to enable
the welfare recipients to become self-siifficient, either by finding them suitable
employment or by providing vocational training for those who are otherwise
unemployable.3" Underlying this development seems to be the notion that the
(AFDC), §§ 601-644]; V [Grants To States for Maternal and Child Welfare, §§ 701-29a]; X
[Grants To States For Aid To The Blind, §§ 1201-06]; XIV [Grants To States For Aid To
the Permanently and Totally Disabled, §§ 1351-55].
27 See generally Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REv.
326, 334 (1966).
28 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 602-04 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1969).
29 42 U.S.C.A. § 606(a) (1964), as amended (Supp. 1969).
30 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1969).
31 In 1968, Congress added Part C-Work Incentive Program for Recipients of Aid Under
State Plans Approved Under Part A-to Subchapter IV of the Social Security Act (AFDC).
The purpose of this addition is set forth in 42 U.S.C.A. § 630 (Supp. 1969):
The purpose of this part is to require the establishment of a program utilizing
all available manpower services, including those authorized under other provisions
of law, under which individuals receiving aid to.families with dependent children
will be furnished incentives, opportunities, and necessary services in order for (1) the
employment of such individuals in the regular economy, (2) the training of such
[Vol. 44:603] NOTES
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provision for residual financial assistance to needy persons is. not sufficient to
enable them to escape the grips of poverty, and that both work-training and
pressure to enter the employment market are necessary."2 This approach has
led to a great proliferation in statutory programs to rehabilitate the poor."
At the present time we are just beginning to realize the full dimensions of
existing poverty in this nation and the problems it has created.' 4 At the same
time, it is evident that the nation has not settled on the approach that will be
taken to eradicate the blight of poverty. Indeed, the only point that would
receive widespread support is that a fundamentally new approach is needed;
there is no general agreement on what that approach should be. Yet, while
this search is taking place, the poor must be provided for within the framework
of the existing statutory system. We cannot ask our legal system alone to re-
make the old system or to streamline the welfare system we have inherited
largely from the seventeenth century. What we can ask of the legal system at
this time, however, is an indication of the limitations that must be placed upon
any public welfare system by our constitutional system of government.
III. The Nature of the Welfare Recipient's Interest
The major legal problem in the area of public welfare is the need to
clarify the relationship between the individual welfare recipient's interest in the
benefits he receives and the public's interest in establishing and maintaining the
programs which transcend the interest of the individual indigent and concen-
trate on effectively dealing with poverty on a broad scale." At the heart of this
problem is the question of what conditions may be placed on the receipt of
individuals for work in the regular economy, and (3) the participation of such
individuals in special work projects, thus restoring the families of such individuals
to independence and useful roles in their communities. It is expected that the
individuals participating in the program established under this part will acquire a
sense of dignity, self-worth, and confidence which will flow from being recognized
as a wage-earning member of society and that the example of a working adult in
these families will have beneficial effects upon the children in such families.
If an AFDC recipient refuses without good cause, to participate in an incentive program or to
accept available employment, he will not be considered in determining the amount of benefits
to be provided to the recipient family. 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a) (19) (F) (Supp. 1969). See also
Hausman, The AFDC Amendments of 1967: Their Impact on the Capacity for Self Support
and the Employability of AFDC Family Heads, 19 LAB. L.J. 496 (1968).
32 This attitude is illustrated by the expressed purpose of the Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964:
Although the economic well-being and prosperity of the United States have
progressed to a level surpassing any achieved in world history, and although these
benefits are widely shared throughout the Nation, poverty continues to be the lot of a
substantial number of our people. The United States can achieve its full economic
and social potential as a nation only if every individual has the opportunity to con-
tribute to the full extent of his capabilities and to participate in the workings of our
society. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to eliminate the paradox of
poverty in the midst of plenty in this Nation by opening to everyone the opportunity
for education and training, the opportunity to work, and the opportunity to live in
decency and dignity. It is the purpose of this chapter to strengthen, supplement, and
coordinate efforts in furtherance of that policy. 42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1964).
33 See, e.g., The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2571-
2620 (1964); and The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2981 (1964).
34 See generally POVERTY AS A PUBLIC ISSUE (B. Seligman ed. 1965).
35 See generally Cowan, supra note 3; Reich, The New Property, 73 YA.E L.J. 733(1964); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
L.J. 1245 (1965).
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financial assistaice by the needy to realize the broad goals of welfare that are
dictated by the public interest. The answer to this question, in turn, demands
a determination of the nature of the legal right of the individual indigent to
assistance from the rest of the community, for it would seem logical that the
nature of this interest must serve as one of the primary limitations on the con-
ditions which can be imposed on any receipt of public assistance.
As noted above, there is no affirmative legal obligation on the part of either
the state or the federal government to come to the assistance of the poor."
Whatever obligation exists has been created by statute, and, as a consequence,
the determination of the individual indigent's interest in financial assistance must
be made in terms of the statutes on which it is based.
A. The Traditional Approach
The traditional legal approach to the interest of the individual in govern-
ment largesse, such as pensions and poor relief, has been to categorize whatever
he was entitled to receive under a statutory program as a "gratuity" to which
he had no "vested right" and which could be granted, vithheld or conditioned
at the complete discretion of the legislature." Under this approach, since the
recipient had no inherent right to the benefits provided by statute, he was not
in a position to challenge the conditions imposed on his eligibility by
the statute." In other words, if a person's claim against the government was
contractual in nature, such as an annuity policy, he was leld' to possess a vested
property interest in the benefits he was entitled to receive under the statute; 9
if there was no contractual relation, as in the case of government pensions or
poor relief, the benefit under the statute was held to be a gift or gratuity, whos6
enjoyment was subject to the broad' discretion of the legislature.4"
Although the "vested right-gratuity" approach has been followed in several
relatively recent state court decisions," it has been abandoned, for all practical
purposes, as a device relevant to the determination of individual rights under our
present-day welfare laws.' This movement away from the use of property law
concepts of "vested right" and "gratuity" to determine the nature of legal rights
in the area of public welfare can only be seen as a positive development, for the
"label approach" was completely unsuited to cover the many complex factors
which must be considered in such a determination. The point is that the welfare
recipient's interest in the financial assistance he receives, whatever it may finally
36 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
37 See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S.
160 (1895); Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464- (1889). See also notes 83-106 infra and accom-
panying text.
38 Frisbie v. United States, 257 U.S. 160, 166 (1895).
39 See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 559, 576 (1934).
40 Frisbie v. United States, 257 U.S. 160, 166 (1895).
41 See, e.g., Mary Lamming Mem. Hosp. v. Clay County, 170 Nebr. 61, 101 N.W.2d 510
(1960); People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 111. 557, 20 N.E.2d 46 (1940); Williams
v. Shapiro, 4 Conn. Oh. 499, 234 A.2d 144 (1964).
42 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); Snell y. Wyman, 281 F. Supp. 853,
863 n.19, aff'd per curiam, 37 U.S.L.W 3242 (Jan. 14, 1969).
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be, is not merely another form of property." Although in certain respects public
assistance can be seen as bearing a strong analogy to property, it is radically
different in form. Whatever right there is to welfare, it is a right to demand
from government the economic necessities of life; this is far different from a
demand that government not deprive a person of his possessions without just
cause or adequate compensation.
B. The Conflicting Interests In Public Welfare
The great difficulty in approaching the legal problems of public welfare
is that there is no available body of legal concepts which can be employed to
adequately deal with the problems. And yet, as the poor of this nation are more
fully brought into our legal processes," the courts, as evidenced by issues that
they already have faced, will be confronted with increasingly perplexing legal
questions.45 We must, therefore, come to some understanding of the conflicting
interests involved in public assistance before we can arrive at a workable frame-
work within which the legal questions can be adequately handled.
Our legal system is quite familiar with the tension between what might be
termed the individual interest and the social interest, and has been very effective
in maintaining a balance between them."6 The individual interest manifests itself
in a demand made by an individual that he have the greatest possible freedom
of activity and that the government protect that activity from outside inter-
ference." The social interest, on the other hand, demands that this free activity
be restrained in certain respects for the public good."' For example, we can point
to limitations imposed on individual activity by the criminal and civil law,
limitations placed on the use of property by nuisance and zoning law, and limi-
tations placed on economic activity by anti-trust and security legislation. The
tension between these interests is expressed in conflict: the individual demands
that government refrain from acting so as to leave him the maximum of free
activity, while society demands, through the government, that personal activity
not go against the public interest."9
In the area of public welfare, or more generally, in any area where the
government is extending positive benefits to certain individuals, the relation-
43 See Reich, The New Property, supra note 35, where Professor Reich develops the thesis
that government largess, including welfare benefits, has the same function in preserving per-
sonal independence and privacy as does private property.
44 See generally Greenawalt, OEO Legal Services For the Poor: An Anniversary Appraisal,
12 N.Y.L.F. 62 (1966).
45 See, e.g., the discussion of durational residence requirements in text accompanying notes
134-47 infra; discussion of the substitute parent rule in text accompanying notes 148-54 infra;
and the imposition of repayment obligations on welfare recipients, discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 58-72 infra.
46 One commentator has expressed this balancing notion well:
Individual and social interests have been fairly well integrated in the legal
process as jural opposites. The familiar balancing tendency of the law in action,
recognized since ancient times, is able to handle the process in accordance with bi-
party practice made standard by the Romans. In other words, since individual and
social interests are taken in the main to conflict, they can be assigned to one side or
the other of the lawsuit Cowan, supra note 3, at 690.
47 See id. at 689.
48 See id.
49 See generally id. at 690.
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ship between the interests of the individual and society is quite different." In
these situations, the individual's demand against the government is not the
negative demand to be left unrestrained in his activities, but a positive demand
that the government provide him with an affirmative service; in the case of a
welfare recipient, the demand is for a sufficiently secure economic base so as to
provide him with at least the bare necessities of life.5 The corresponding social
interests in such a situation are very complex and must be examined in light of
the social goals the legislature set out to achieve when enacting the particular
statutory program under which assistance is made available. For example,
AFDC was enacted:
For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in
their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State
to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services,
as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy
dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living
to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents or
relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and
personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing
parental care and protection.5 2
As can be seen from this provision, the purposes of AFDC are many. While,
on the first level, the program is geared to meeting the obligation the government
has acknowledged in behalf of society to provide assistance to those who are
unable to care for themselves, there are other purposes that transcend the in-
dividual indigent's need for public assistance. On the second level, the government
provides financial assistance to dependent children and the parent and relative
with whom they are living, not merely to provide them with the necessities of
life, but "to maintain and strengthen family life" and to help indigent persons
"to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal in-
dependence." In fact, from one point of view, it seems that the financial as-
sistance provided to the poor under the various programs is not the goal of these
programs, but a device, a means, to achieve the ultimate goal of the program -
the strengthening of family life and the attainment of self-support - to the
greatest possible extent for a particular class of persons. While the attainment
of these goals would be to the benefit of the individual recipient, they are goals
that go beyond the individual and reflect the ultimate social interest in having
as many persons as possible escape the hardships of abject poverty and become
contributing members of the economy.
This demand by individuals against the whole of society for positive, af-
firmative public services that are both in their interest and in the public interest,
has been called a "social security interest" to distinguish it from more familiar
demands on the legal system.53 This terminology will be used in developing the
legal issues present in the public welfare area.
50 Professor Cowan further observes: "The present job [incorporation of social security in-
terests into the legal process] is further complicated by the fact that the newer security demands
appear to differ in kind from any interest heretofore secured by law.... ." Id. at 688.
51 See id. at 689.
52 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964).
53 See Cowan, supraz note 3, at 689.
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The interests of the individual and society that come together in the social
security interest are not, at first glance, in conflict. The individual indigent desires
to be provided with the necessities of life; society desires to provide him with
these necessities. However, while the individual indigent and society want es-
sentially the same thing, they seek it for different reasons. The difference is in
what society ultimately hopes to accomplish for the public good by assisting the
indigent. Society is going beyond maintenance of the poor as a goal and is
using public welfare as a device to achieve further goals. It is here that the
individual indigent's interest and the social interest come into conflict.5 4 The
individual wants to receive financial assistance and at the same time maintain
the maximum of personal freedom, while the government, in behalf of society,
exerts pressure on the individual by imposing conditions on the receipt of finan-
cial assistance with the hopes of influencing, encouraging, or perhaps even
coercing the individual into acting in the public interest. His freedom of choice
is thereby reduced and the familiar conflict between personal freedom and the
public interest becomes apparent. The difficulty is in isolating the legal issues which
arise from this conflict and in understanding how they should be handled by
the legal system.
C. Group Aspects of the Individual's Interest
Further insight can be gained into the nature of an indigent person's in-
terest in public assistance by noting that it is essentially a group interest, rather
than an individual interest.5" This can be demonstrated by the manner in which
the public welfare system functions. A needy person is eligible for assistance if
he satisfies all the conditions for eligibility imposed by the statute. These condi-
tions, however, define a class of persons who are eligible, and, thus, it is by
being a member of this class that a person becomes eligible for assistance. For
example, a needy child is eligible for benefits under AFDC as a "dependent
child" if he meets the strict requirements of that category, as defined in Sub-
chapter IV of the Social Security Act.56 In other words, the right to financial
54 Professor Reich has stated: "In the regulation of government largess, achievement of
specific policy goals may undermine the independence of the individual. Where such conflicts
exist, a simplistic notion of the public interest may unwittingly destroy some values." Reich,
The New Property, supra note 35, at 774.
55 The idea has been articulated by commentator Cowan:
Social security interests are somewhat like individual interests also: they are as-
serted against the entire social group through the agency or mediation of government.
On the other hand they differ from individual interests in this: though individuals
benefit, they benefit not as individuals, but as members of social groups. Whereas
social interests purport to serve the whole of society, social security interests serve
only certain subgroups in the population. Cowan, supra note 3, at 689.
56 This statutory group is defined as follows:
(a) The term "dependent child" means a needy child (1) who has been
deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from
the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his
father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, step-
brother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence
maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own. home, and (2) who
is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) under the age of twenty-one and (as deter-
mined by the State in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) a
student regularly attending a school, college, or university, its equivalent, or regularly
attending a course of vocational or technical Iraining designed to fit him for gainful
employment; 42 U.S.C.A. § 606(a) (Supp. 1969).
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assistance under a given statutory programis a right that inheres in membership
in a group that is defined by the statute, and not in the individual simply as a
person. A social security interest, therefore, serves only a group of similarly-
situated individuals and represents a group claim against the rest of society.
D. The Legal Issues
From this notion that the right to public assistance is a right that derives
from membership in a group which is entitled to assistance under a statute, the
concrete legal issues begin to emerge in perspective. Most of the cases that have
been brought have challenged the conditions imposed by statute either to acquire
or maintain eligibility for assistance as denying constitutionally protected rights
or as creating invidious classifications contrary to the equal protection clause."
In other words, the majority of the cases have dealt with the nature of the
limitations on the legislature's ability to condition the receipt of assistance in
the public interest - or what the legislature felt was in the public interest.
The issue of what a welfare recipient has a right to receive, once he is
eligible for assistance, has been raised only indirectly. Nevertheless, there are
serious questions as to what restrictions the government may place on available
financial assistance which go to the very heart of the individual indigent's interest
in public assistance.
E. Repayment Obligations and the Nature of the Interest
In Snell v. Wyman, 8 the Supreme Court affirmed per curiam the decision
of a three-judge district court that held constitutional certain New York sta-
tutes59 which imposed an obligation upon welfare recipients to repay the cost of
the benefits they have received through liens on their real property, actual
or potential recoveries for personal injuries, and the assignment of the recipient's
interest in insurance policies." These welfare laws and the complementary
administrative regulations were challenged on several grounds. First, it was
charged that they denied due process under the fourteenth amendment in that
they were arbitrary, oppressive and irrational in defeating the stated objective
of the welfare program of seeking to make welfare recipients productive and self-
supporting.61 In response to this, the court held that the challenged statutes
possessed sufficient rationality to satisfy due process.62 The court felt that to rule
otherwise would amount to judging the wisdom of the legislature, a task which
is outside the power of the judiciary." The second major argument was that the
repayment obligation constituted a denial of equal protection, in that the state
maintained other welfare programs without seeking repayment and that the re-
payment obligation discriminates between those who have property -and those
57 See the decisions enumerated in note 1 supra.
58 37 U.S.L.W. 3242 (Jan. 14, 1969).
59 N.Y. Social Welfare Law §§ 104, 104a, 105, 360 (McKinney 1966).
60 281 F. Supp. 853, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
61 Id. at 861.




who do not. 4 The court dismissed these arguments as frivolous65 and noted that
"[i]t would be difficult to conceive of a more pertinent criterion for welfare as-
sistance" that the possession of money or property.6 The third argument was
that the statutes imposing the repayment obligation were inconsistent with the
Social Security Act, thereby violating the supremacy clause of the Constitution.67
The court held that since "the statutes plaintiffs attack reach only to property
already owned or to acquisitions which have more or less the character of
"windfalls" - at least in the sense that such acquisitions do not result from
purposeful efforts to 'attain or retain capability for self-support or self-care,' "68
there could be no inconsistency with the purposes of the federal provisions.
Furthermore, the federal statutes provide that the periodic grants to the states
are to be reduced by the federal government's pro rata share of the funds re-
covered from welfare recipients. 9
It is important to note that under the welfare regulations of the City of
New York, "No referral [for recovery purposes] shall be made if the newly
acquired assets consist solely of income from employment,"7 and, thus, no re-
covery could be sought out of the wages or salary of a recipient or out of property
acquired with such earnings.7 The district court opinion relied on this fact in
holding that the New York repayment obligation did not contradict the under-
lying policy of the Social Security Act of encouraging recipients to become self-
supporting."2 This reliance, in turn, is enough to raise a serious doubt as to
whether a repayment obligation imposed upon the earnings of a welfare recipient
would be consistent with the purpose of the federal program.
Regardless of the fact that the full extent of the state's power to require
repayment is still in doubt, Snell v. Wyman did hold that the state has the con-
stitutional power to impose upon welfare recipients the obligation to repay the
cost of the assistance they have received out of certain types of assets. The state
is able to restrict the granting of public assistance so that the assistance takes on
many of the characteristics of an advancement or loan, which matures into an
obligation whenever the recipient is financially able to repay.73 Consistent with
this is the fact that the state is given the general power under the federal AFDC
64 Id. at 865.
65 Id. at 865-66.
66 Id. at 866 n.23.
67 Id. at 867-69.
68 Id. at 867-68.
69 Id. at 868. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 603(b) (2), 1353(b)(2) (1964). Judge Kaufman, in
dissent, argued that while the states have the power to recover public assistance expenditures
from recipients, the New York statutes and regulations were not precise enough -to protect "the
freedom to achieve 'self-support and personal independence'" which is "within the compass
of 'liberty' secured by the Fourteenth Amendment against undue restraint." Snell v. Wyman,
281 F. Supp. 853, 869-71 (1968).
70 Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Supp. 853, 860 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), quoting from Policies
Governing the Administration of Public Assistance, City of New York Department of Welfare,
§ 189 (reissued August 1, 1963).
71 Id. at 860.
72 Id. at 867-68.
73 Other lower court decisions have recognized this "repayment" theory on governmental
benefits. See, e.g., Lalic v. Chicago, B & Q R.R., 263 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Francis
v. Harris, 100 N.J. Super. 313, 241 A.2d 844 (1968). Beck v. Buena Park Hotel Corp., 30
Ill. 2d 343, 196 N.E.2d 686 (1964); Newland v. Child, 254 P.2d 1066 (Idaho 1953); Dimke
v. Finke, 209 Minn. 29, 295 N.W. 75 (1940).
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statutes to supervise the use of assistance payments when the recipient is unable
to properly manage his financial affairs.ss
Furthermore, although not expressly mentioned by the Court, the holding
in Snell apparently allows the state to require the execution of liens and the as-
signment of interests as valid conditions for maintaining eligibility for assistance,
since, under the New York regulations, "refusal by the applicant to assign shall
constitute ineligibility for public assistance."'' 5 Thus, Snell v. Wyman stands as
an indication of the very broad power the states apparently have to determine
exactly what a welfare recipient is to receive and the terms and conditions under
which these benefits, once received, are to be enjoyed.
F. The Entitlement Theory
It is in the context of this broad state power that the plea for the recogni-
tion of a "vested right" in the welfare recipient to public assistance must be
considered. 6 The essential notion here is that in order to achieve a balance
between the personal freedom and independence of the individual recipient
and the public interest, the benefits provided under our welfare system must
rest on a more secure foundation.Y This notion has led to what is known as
the theory of entitlement:
The idea of entitlement is simply that when individuals have insuf-
ficient resources to live under conditions of health and decency, society
has obligations to provide support, and the individual is entitled to that
support as of right. To the greatest degree possible, public welfare should
rest upon a comprehensive concept of actual need spelled out in objectively
defined eligibility that assures a maximum degree of security and inde-
pendence.
[The concept of entitlement] means that the individual's rights, what-
ever they may be, should be known to him and enforceable through law.7 8
The theory of entitlement is based, first of all, on the view that the institu-
tion of private property, or more particularly, the economic security which it
provides the individual, is the foundation of human dignity and personal freedom
under our system of government" At the same time, the theory of entitlement
74 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 606(b)(2) (Supp. 1969).
75 New York Dept. of Social Services Reg. § 18-369.2 quoted in Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.
Supp. 853, 856 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
76 See generally Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 143,
154-55 (1958); Reich, The New Property, supra note 35, at 785, 786 & n.233; Reich, Indi-
vidual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, supra note 35, at 1255-56;
tenBroek & Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance - A Normative Evaluation, 1
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 237 (1954).
77 Government largess, like all wealth, must necessarily be regulated in the public
interest. But regulation must take account of the dangers of dependence, and the
need for a property base for civil liberties. Rightly conceived, the public interest is nojustification for the erosion of freedom that has resulted from the present system of
government largess. Reich, The New Property, supra note 35, at 777.
78 Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, supra note 35,
at 1256.
79 "Mrhe only dependable foundation of personal liberty is the economic security of privateproperty." W. LiPPMANN, THsE METHOD OF FREEDOM 101 (1934) quoted in Reich, The New
Property, supra note 35, at 773.
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is, in reality, founded on the fact that private property, in the traditional sense,
is being replaced by the largesse of government as a principal source of economic
security for the individual.8" The problem is that this source of economic security
is none too secure, in that government largesse is granted or withheld largely
with an eye to the public interest alone, and with little regard for the functions
it has to insure an economic foundation for the independence, dignity and free-
dom that are the great blessings of this nation.8
The theory of entitlement, therefore, embodies a concrete, precise position as
to the kind of balance that must exist between the interest of the welfare recipient
to financial assistance and the public interest, so that the fundamental values of
our political system may be enjoyed by the less-affluent. While the appeal of
entitlement undoubtedly contains elements that reach the fundamental policy
of our welfare system and, thus, are directed to the legislature rather than to the
courts, the central idea of entitlement - the recognition of definite and en-
forceable legal rights in the welfare recipient correlative to the obligation govern-
ment has assumed to provide assistance to the needy - constitutes an appeal
to which only our legal system can respond.81
G. Conditions for Eligibility - The Major Issue
The broad issue facing the courts in public welfare cases that deal with
substantive, rather than procedural, rights can thus be stated in simple terms:
What are the enforceable legal rights of an indigent person under our present
welfare system? Given the fact that the welfare system is based on statute, the
rights of the indigent person are, of course, initially determined by statute. The
statutes determine who has a right to welfare benefits by defining the class of
persons eligible and delineate what the eligible recipient has a right to receive
by providing for the nature of the benefits to be made available. Clearly then,
in facing the question of what legal rights an individual has to public assistance,
the courts are not called upon to create or recognize a right that exists apart
from the statutes, but are faced with the difficult and unappealing task of de-
ciding whether the statutory determinations made by the legislature are con-
stitutionally permissible.
From the Snell decision, it appears that there is no constitutional limitation
on the types of benefits that may be made available and the manner in which
such benefits may be regulated. Consequently, the legislature may provide for
monetary assistance without attached strings, or it may treat assistance as a
loan or advancement, as is done in New York, by attaching liens on the welfare
recipient's property, with the government assuming the position of a creditor.
Likewise, it seems that the legislature, in its discretion, may regulate the use of
monetary assistance after it is in the recipient's hands, but the full extent of
the government's power in this area is impossible to determine at this time. Thus,
80 See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, supra
note 35, at 1255.
81 See Reich, The New Property,'supra note 35, at 774.
82 See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, supra
note 35, at 1256.
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the question of what the welfare recipient is entitled to receive once he is eligible
for assistance is not a significant legal issue.
The only remaining issue is the question of the nature and extent of con-
stitutional limitations on the legislature's power to creat conditions of eligibility
for public assistance in such a way that persons are included or excluded from
the eligible class of recipients for public policy reasons. What follows then is a
detailed consideration of the existing legal doctrines which must be used to de-
termine the constitutional validity of eligibility requirements for public welfare.
IV. Conditions Upon Eligibility
A. The Unconstitutional Conditions Test
Unconstitutional conditions cannot be attached to the receipt of benefits in
such a way that the recipient of the benefit is forced to choose between the
benefit and the relinquishment of a constitutional right."3 This is what is meant
by the unconstitutional conditions test. At the outset, this test must be clearly
differentiated, however, from the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Basically, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is the theory that the
right to withhold encompasses the right to offer on any terms.8 4 To begin with,
"rights" and "privileges" must be distinguished. While rights are guaranteed
and carefully protected, privileges, since they are mere governmental gratuities,
can be conditioned almost without limitation, or not granted at all. In theory
then, the benevolent government granting privileges may attach any desired
conditions to one's eligibility for their receipt.8 5
The right-privilege dichotomy and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
drawn from it has been traced historically to early cases upholding the power
of the state to grant or deny permission to a foreign corporation to do business
locally."s Initially, it had been held that a state could prevent a foreign corpora-
tion from transacting business within its boundaries unless the corporation were
willing to agree to certain conditions.8 " The theory was that the corporation
did not have a right to do business within the state; it was merely being granted
a privilege. The state's power to withhold this privilege altogether was neces-
83 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) and text accompanying notes 107-09
infra.
84 See French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEo. L.J. 234 (1961). An
adequate judicial statement of the doctrine can be found in United States v. Cook:
[C]ongress in shaping the form of its bounty may impose conditions and limita-
tions on its acquisition and enjoyment by the beneficiaries which it could not impose
on the use and enjoyment-by them of a vested right. 257 U.S. 523, 527 (1922).
85 See Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. Rv.
321 (1935); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 H~Av. L. REv. 1595 (1960); Wilcox, In-
vasions of the First Amendment Through Conditioned Public Spending, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 12
(1955); French, supra note 84.
86 See G. HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AmERIcAN CONSTI-
TONAL LAW 132-47 (1918).
87 See Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 542 (1877), holding that a state could
compel a foreign corporation to forego removal of lawsuits to the federal courts as a precondi-
tion to transacting business within the state. This decision, however, was overruled in Terral v.
Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922).
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sarily thought to include the right to extend the privilege upon any conditions
which the state chose to attach."8
The logic of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, however, proved
difficult to defend." Supposedly, it was based on the proposition that a whole
equals the sum of its parts: the whole being the power to deny a privilege and
the parts being the powers to impose conditions on the granting of a privilege."
The fallacy behind the assumption that this "greater" ought always to include such
a "lesser" has now been demonstrated with persuasive analysis by many writers and
commentators.91 What is more important, however, is that the case law has
gradually abandoned the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and the more
recent Supreme Court decisions - to be discussed below - have refused to even
consider arguments based on the old right-privilege distinction.
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission of California,92
decided in 1926, represents the first major breakthrough in this area. In holding
that California could not prohibit the use of its highways to foreign contract
carrier trucking companies who refused to assume the status and duties of com-
mon carriers, the Supreme Court, without expressly repudiating the right-priv-
ilege argument, said:
It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule,
the state, having the power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it
upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state
in that respect is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is that it may
not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional
rights.93
More recent cases, however, have consistently rejected the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine by expressly refusing to recognize right-privilege arguments.
In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,94 the New Mexico Board of Bar Ex-
aminers attempted to justify their refusal to permit a former member of the
Communist Party to take the state bar examination on the ground that he was
morally unfit. Holding that this justification for the Board's denial contravened
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court, in a
mere footnote, rejected the argument that the privilege of practicing law in a
state could be so conditioned:
We need not enter into a discussion whether the practice of law is a "right"
or "privilege." Regardless of how the State's grant of permission to en-
gage in this occupation is characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person
cannot be prevented from practicing except for valid reasons.9 5
88 Packard v. Banta, 264 U.S. 140, 144 (1924); Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48
(1897).
89 For an argument showing the inadequacy of the doctrine, see Hale, supra note 85, at
321-22.
90 For a thorough treatment of this argument, see French, supra note 84, at 237.
91 See, e.g., Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 COLUM. L. lv. 99, 110-11
(1916).
92 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
93 Id. at 593-94.
94 353 U.S. 232 (1957). See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
95 353 U.S. at 239 n.5.
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The unconstitutional conditions doctrine was similarly rejected in Speiser
v. Randall," a case which involved the constitutional validity of a provision in
the California Constitution which afforded tax exemptions to veterans. This
provision provided that the applicants subscribe to oaths that they did not
advocate the overthrow of the federal or state government by force, violence
or other unlawful means, or advocate the support of a foreign government against
the United States in the event of hostilities. The Court held this provision
tantamount to a denial of free speech and, therefore, struck it down as uncon-
stitutional." Once again the unconstitutional conditions doctrine was advanced
without success. Flatly rejecting the argument by the State that the exemption
was a privilege which could be conditioned by the requirement of such an oath,
the Court declared:
The appellees are plainly mistaken in their argument that, because a tax
exemption is a "privilege" or "bounty," its denial may not infringe speech.
This contention did not prevail before the California courts, which rec-
ognized that conditions imposed upon the granting of privileges or gratuities
must be "reasonable."98g
Even Fleming v. Nestor,99 a controversial five-four opinion which held
constitutional a social security statute terminating the old age benefits of aliens
deported for illegal entry, commission of a crime, or subversive activity, refused
to accept the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Conceding that Congress
could not exercise its power to modify the statutory scheme of social security free
of all constitutional restraint, the Court said, "It is hardly profitable to engage
in conceptualizations regarding 'earned rights' and 'gratuities? "100
When Sherbert v. Verner""r was decided a few years later, there was little
doubt that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions lacked all vitality and
that the right-privilege distinction was virtually useless. Mrs. Sherbert was a
Seventh Day Adventist who was unable to obtain employment because she could
not work on Saturday. Upon being denied unemployment compensation by
South Carolina on the grounds that she had failed without good cause to accept
suitable work, she claimed that her constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion had been abridged. It was held that the woman's disqualification for
unemployment benefits because of her refusal to accept work on Saturday con-
tary to her religions beliefs was unconstitutional,"°2 and once more the persistent
unconstitutional conditions doctrine was rejected. This time, however, the
Court made it quite clear that the doctrine would continue to receive little
acknowledgment:
Nor may the South Carolina court's construction of the statute be
saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment
compensation benefits are not appellant's "right" but merely a "privilege."
96 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
97 Id. at 527-28.
98 Id. at 518.
99 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
100 Id. at 610.
101 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
102 Id. at 406.
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It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression
may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit
or privilege. 0 3
It seems clear that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is no longer
a proper argument to be used to uphold the constitutional validity of conditions
which the state attaches to benefits. The durational residence requirement test
cases have dismissed it as irrelevant. 4 It has been exposed as logically flimsy
by scholars who urged its abandonment,' and ignored, if not repudiated, by
the Supreme Court. More importantly, the traditional unconstitutional condi-
tions analysis blurs total comprehension of the significance of the issues in a given
case for the simple reason that it is too superficial to be adequate.'
However, what has been described as the unconstitutional conditions test
has survived the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Rightly ignoring the anti-
quated right-privilege distinction, the test prevents the state from attaching con-
ditions to a benefit which, by their application, force a recipient to forego a
constitutional right. Both the Speiser and Sherbert decisions are primary ex-
amples.
In Speiser, the state effectively limited the tax-exempt beneficiary's right
of free speech by the exercise of its taxing power. This, the Court said, imposed
an unconstitutional condition regardless of the nature of the tax benefit: "To
deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in
effect to penalize them for such speech."'0 ° Sherbert was even more explicit in
applying the unconstitutional conditions test. Relying upon Speiser, it emphasized
that conditions upon public benefits could not be sustained if the conditions
operated to inhibit or deter the exercise of first amendment rights.'08 Condi-
tioning Mrs. Sherbert's availability for unemployment compensation upon her
willingness to violate a principle of her religion would unjustly penalize her for
freely practicing her religion.'
The attack on durational residence requirements has heavily relied upon
the unconstitutional conditions test."0 The inapplicability of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine only adds strength to those challenging the AFDC residence
requirements who rely upon cases like Speiser and Sherbert. The argument is
made that if a tax exemption in Speiser could not be denied by forcing the recip-
ient to choose between the exemption and his right to speak freely, and if un-
employment compensation in Sherbert could not be denied by forcing the recip-
ient to choose between the compensation and her freedom of religious conviction,
then, a state cannot deny AFDC benefits under residence requirements by forcing
103 Id. at 404. A listing at 404 n.6 enumerates several examples of conditions and qualifi-
cations upon governmental privileges and benefits which have been invalidated because of their
tendency to inhibit constitutionally protected activity.
104 See, e.g., Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22, 28 (D.D.C. 1967).
105 See Powell, supra note 91, at 110-11.
106 See French, supra note 84, at 244-46, where the author discusses the critical problem of
focus in this area.
107 357 U.S. at 518.
108 374 U.S. at 405.
109 Id. at 405-06.
110 See generally Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for G4neral and Cate-
gorical Assistance Programs, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 567 (1966).
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a recipient to choose between the benefits and the right to travel freely interstate.
Arguendo, it does not matter that first amendment rights were involved in
Speiser and Sherbert. The same dilemma between accepting a benefit or re-
linquishing a constitutional right is present and the constitutional right to travel
from one state to another and to settle where one pleases does occupy a funda-
mental position. Moreover, the right to travel interstate is closely related to the
first amendment rights of free speech and association.
Relying on Edwards v. California,"' which held that the imposition of
criminal sanctions on those who transported indigent persons into California
prevented non-resident indigents from coming into the state and constituted an
unconstitutional limitation on the right to travel freely between the states," 2
the "travel" argument urges that durational residence requirements for AFDC
eligibility constitute a similar proscription on the same right."3 The argument need
not fail if it is not proven conclusively that residence tests adversely affect inter-
state movement for all purposes, since the unconstitutional conditions test will
not permit a single indigent migrant to be punished by making him ineligible for
AFDC because he has exercised his right to travel." 4 If residence requirements
either discourage the right to travel or punish the exercise of the right to travel,
the unconstitutional conditions test may render them invalid.
Nevertheless, for several reasons, the travel argument is not a particularly
strong basis for striking down durational residence requirements." 5 First, the
right to travel is not absolute and both the federal and state governments have
been held able to condition the right."6 Secondly, the Edwards case is dearly
distinguishable. It involved a criminal statute which imposed a direct and per-
manent prohibition upon bringing indigent persons into the state. The durational
residence requirements are civil, non-prohibitory as regards entrance and settle-
ment in a state, and any interference which they may have with the right to
travel is, at most, an indirect discouragement that is temporary. In addition, as
the Supreme Court explicitly pointed out, all that was determined by Edwards
was the propriety of an attempt by a state to prohibit transportation of in-
digent non-residents and the question of relief to newcomers was not involved."
111 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
112 Id. at 177.
113 Id.
114 See notes 108-09 supra and accompanying text.
115 This was emphasized by Judge Holtzoff in denying the original application for the
convening of the three-judge district court in Harrell v. Tobriner, 269 F. Supp. 920, 921(D.D.C. 1967): "The suggestion that such a residence requirement interferes with the free-
dom of travel guaranteed by due process of law is too far-fetched and remote to justify
extended discussion." For an analysis of the travel argument's weaknesses, see Comment, The
Constitutionality of Residence Requirements for State Welfare Recipients, 63 Nw. L. Rv.
351, 369-72 (1968); Comment, Constitutional Law: State Residence Requirements for Wel-
fare Aid Held Unconstitutional, 52 MINN. L. Rv. 561, 569 (1967); and Note, Analysis of
Welfare Residence Requirements in Light of Recent Decisions, 29 U. PTT. L. REv. 138, 143-
48 (1967).
116 See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1965); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1,
7-8 (1959); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); South Carolina State High-
way Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
117 The Supreme Court stated:[We are not now called upon to determine anything other than the propriety of
an attempt by a State to prohibit the transportation of indigent non-residents into its
territory. The nature and extent of its obligation to afford relief to newcomers is not
here involved. 314 U.S. at 174.
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Thirdly, though the right to travel does occupy a fundamental position"8s and
has been thought to be closely related to first amendment rights of free speech
and association," 9 these latter rights have been held to have a "preferred posi-
tion."'2 ° There may appear to be an indirect analogy between the "chilling ef-
fect" which the threat of prosecution had on free speech in Dombrowski v.
Pfister 2' and the discouragement which the threat to withhold welfare has on
travel in the durational residence requirement cases.' 22 But, in fact, argument
from Dombrowski is hardly proper, for that case established a test for federal
courts to determine jurisdiction in free speech cases, 2 and its application has
been limited to the right of expression under the first amendment. 24 Finally,
there is little evidence2 that durational residence requirements for welfare inter-
fere with interstate travel and settlement to a greater extent than valid residence
requirements might in other areas. Residence requirements conditioning voting
rights, for instance, were upheld as constitutional without any finding that they
interfered with interstate migration. 2 Significantly then, most of the three-
judge district courts which heard the AFDC residence requirement test cases
decided them on the grounds that durational residence requirements violated the
equal protection clause, and in doing so they applied, not an unconstitutional
conditions test, but the reasonable relationship test. 2
B. The Reasonable Relationship Test
Any legislative classification must be reasonably related to the purpose of
the statute in order to pass as constitutional under the equal protection or due
118 See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966); Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160, 177-81 (1940) (Douglas, J., concurring); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 (6 Wall) 35,
48-49 (1867); Passenger Cases, 48 (7 How) 282, 492 (1849).
119 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
300 U.S. 500, 517 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-27 (1958). For a further
elaboration on this point, see CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RiGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787,
192-93 (1956).
120 The preferred position of the first amendment rights is well established. See, e.g.,
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509
(1946).
121 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
122 Dombrowski v. Pfister deals with the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It is essentially
an abstention case, holding that the federal courts can reach a determination of the constitu-
tionality of state statutes regulating expression before any criminal prosecution is initiated by
the state, because the right of expression is so fragile and sensitive that its exercise would be
effectively prevented or discouraged by the mere threat of criminal prosecution. The impor-
tance of the right is too great to allow its exercise to be interfered with by prolonged crim-
inal proceedings, or worse, by harassment in the form of threats to prosecute.
123 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Zwickler v. Koota,
389 U.S. 241 (1967).
124 See Heard v. Rizzo, 281 F. Supp. 720, 728 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (holding Dombrowski v.
Plister not applicable where non-freedom of expression rights are involved).
125 See generally articles cited in note 145 infra.
126 See Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 380 U.S.
125 (1965).
127 See, e.g., Green v. Department of Public Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173, 178 (D. Del.
1967); Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65, 68 (E.D. Pa. 1967). Thompson v. Shapiro, 270
F. Supp. 331, 336 (D. Conn. 1967), holding Connecticut's one-year residence requirement in




process clauses of the Constitution. This requirement was expressed long ago in
Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway v. Ellis:1 2 8
[The attempted classification] ... must always rest upon some difference
which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which
the classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without
any such basis." 9
The reasonable relationship test, as it has been consistently adhered to by the
courts, poses the question "whether the classifications drawn in a statute are
reasonable in the light of its purpose."'3 0 The decisions of Schware and Nestor
both demonstrate the application of the reasonable relationship test. In Schware,
the test was framed in the following manner:
A state can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral
character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the
bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the ap-
plicants fitness or capacity to practice law.13'
The Court then decided that, since the appellant's alleged membership in the
Communist Party many years before did not justify an inference that he had
a bad moral character when he applied to take the bar examination, there
was no reasonable relationship between his possible membership in the Party
in the past and his qualification for present fitness to take the examination.m "2
Though radically different, both factually and in its outcome, Nestor also
started 'with the premise that a condition attached to a governmental benefit
had to have a reasonable relationship with the benefit's purpose to be valid.
In finding such a reasonable relationship the Court said:
'The fact of a beneficiary's residence abroad - in the case of a deportee,
a presumably permanent residence - can be of obvious relevance to the
question of eligibility. One benefit which may be thought to accrue to the
economy from the Social Security system is the increased over-all national
purchasing power resulting from taxation of productive elements of the
economy to provide payments to the retired and disabled, who, might other-
wise be destitute or nearly so, and who would generally spend a com-
paratively large percentage of their benefit payments. This advantage would
be lost as to payments made to one residing abroad. 33
Regardless of the extension which the Court had to make to find a relationship
that could be said to be reasonably connected to one -of the major purposes of
the social security system, the analysis shows the Courtsconcern with this test.
The most persuasive attack on durational residence requirements has relied
128 .1165 U.S. 150 (1897).
129 Id. at 155.
130 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.' 184, 191 (1964). For other examples where this test
has been applied to classifications within statutes, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89;
93 (1965); Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1957); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42
(1915).
131 353 U.S. at 239.
132" Id. at"238-39.
133 363 U.S. at 612.
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upon the reasonable relationship test.' Those who argue that one-year residence
requirements violate the equal protection clause claim that such a waiting period
has no reasonable relation to the purposes of AFDC. Given the express statutory
purposes of AFDC legislation - namely public assistance to those in need, the
maintenance and strengthening of family life, and the achievement of self-
support and self-care' 35 - the contention is made that it is difficult to see how with-
holding aid until an applicant has lived in a state for twelve months is consistent.
In fact, the denial of aid until a year had passed could usually be expected to
compound the evils which public assistance in this area is designed to alleviate. 6
None of the purposes advanced by the states who were called upon to
defend their durational residence requirements have satisfied the reasonable re-
lationship test." 7 Purposes suggested have included: (a) prevention of the mi-
gration of paupers;".. (b) protection of the state's fisc;"0. (c) provision for an
objective test of bona fide residence; 4 . and (d) administrative convenience.' 4'
The first two alleged justifications - prevention of the migration of paupers
and protection of the state fisc - are really two sides of the same coin. Neither,
however, is acceptable. The equal protection clause requires that a state not
discriminate against any of its residents on the basis of their economic condi-
tion." In addition, the Edwards case, which rejected California's argument
that it had to protect itself from the influx of paupers who were flooding the
state during the Great Depression, forecloses the argument that a residence re-
quirement is reasonable, in relation to the purposes of AFDC, because a state
has a right to protect its fisc.14 ' It is doubtful that any state today can claim that
the threat to its purse, due to a vast immigration of welfare-seeking indigents, is
as great as the threat to the financial stability of California during the 1930's."4
134 See cases cited in note 127 supra.
135 See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
136 Judge Fahy, in Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22, 27 (D.D.C. 1967), relying upon
the findings of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
as detailed in The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, in an emotional acceptance of this
view declared:
Indeed, the denial of assistance for an entire year to otherwise qualified recipients
may only erode values which the statute tries to promote. The spread over a year's
time of the evils which public assistance seeks to combat may mean that aid, when
it becomes available, will be too late: Too late to prevent the separation of a family
into foster homes or Junior Villages; too late to heal sickness due -to malnutrition or
exposure; too late to help a boy from succumbing to crime.
137 See cases cited in notes 138-41 infra. But see Waggoner v. Rosenn, 286 F. Supp. 275
(M.D. Pa. 1968), where the three-judge court, in refusing to substitute their judgment for
-that of the legislature, upheld the one-year residence requirement on the basis that it "cannot
be condemned as so lacking in rational justification as to offend due process." Id. at 278.
138 See, e.g., Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22, 28 (D.D.C. 1967).
139 See, e.g., Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 336-37 (D. Conn. 1967).
140 See, e.g., Green v. Department of Public Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173, 177-78 (D. DeL
1967).
141 See, e.g., Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65, 68 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
142 Three decisions are frequently cited for this proposition: Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (holding as unconstitutional Virginia's poll tax which
conditioned the right to vote on payment of a fee); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-
57 (1963) (holding as unconstitutional the denial of an attorney to an indigent on his first
appeal); and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (holding as unconstitutional the
denial of a transcript of trial proceedings to an indigent).
143 314 U.S. at 173-74.
144 In New York, however, problem of indigent in-migration is approaching serious propor-
tions. In New York City alone it is estimated that Ys of the population of eight million people
are on welfare. See Trma, Nov. 1, 1968, at 23.
[April, 1969]
[Vol. 44:603]
In fact, many recent studies show that few people migrate for welfare.145
The second two purposes alleged to justify durational residence requirements
provision for an objective test of bona fide residence and administrative ef-
ficiency - have been similarly rejected as not reasonably related to the purpose
of AFDC."  It may be contended that a one-year waiting period avoids pay-
ments tainted with fraud or based upon insufficient information. But whatever
"efficiency" arguments may be legitimately advanced to support a waiting period
for all applicants, regardless of the required length of residence, they cannot
reasonably be used to support a provision denying benefits to all needy and other-
wise eligible applicants who have resided in the state less than one year while
benefits are granted to applicants similarly-situated who have resided in the state
for more than one year. As the Supreme Court has held in analogous situations,
"constitutional deprivations may not be justified by some remote administrative
benefit to the state."'4 7 On the basis of this analysis, it is clear that the classi-
fications made by durational residence requirements have been consistently held
to violate the equal protection clause because they lack any legitimate purpose
consistent with the purposes of AFDC.
C. The Statutory Construction Test
Another method of testing a challenge made to the conditions which are
attached to benefits is the statutory construction test. This test determines the
validity of a statute by deciding whether or not it conforms with the legislative
intent or present legislative purpose behind the statute. Such a test can serve
as a valuable "escape valve," particularly where the consequences of a decision
based upon the earlier discussed tests might be undesirable or dangerously un-
predictable.
The recent decision of King v. Smith 4 " illustrates this. At issue was the
validity of Alabama's so-called "substitute father" regulation which denied AFDC
payments to otherwise eligible children if their mother "cohabited" with a man
who was not obligated by Alabama law to support the children. The three-
judge district court which heard the case had held that this "substitute father"
regulation, denying aid to needy dependent children because of the immoral
conduct of their mother, was an arbitrary and unreasonable classification, de-
priving the children of equal protection rights under the fourteenth amend-
ment. 4 ' In affirming this decision, the Supreme Court avoided the reasonable
145 These studies indicate that people move instead for a complex of reasons, the most
common relating to promises of employment and the presence of relatives in the state of in-
migration. See, e.g., J. LANsiNG, THE GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY OF LABOR (1963).
146 See, e.g., Green v. Department of Public Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173, 177-78 (D. Del.
1967); Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65, 68 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
147 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (holding the administrative difficulties in
determining the bona fide residence of servicemen did not justify denying them the right to vote).
See also Harmon v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 542 (1965) (holding that administrative benefit
did not justify requiring payment of a poll tax or filing of a certificate of residence as proof of
bona fide residence).
148 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
149 277 F. Supp. 31, 41 (M.D. Ala. 1967). The court argued:
The Alabama regulation directs that Aid to Dependent Children financial as-
sistance not to be given to a class of children who meet the statutory eligibility
requirements and that this financial assistance be denied for an arbitrary reason -
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relationship test entirely, and, instead, chose to resort to the statutory construc-
tion test."' Tracing the history of AFDC legislation from its origin, the Court
made three important conclusions: first, that Congress had not made the state's
alleged interest in discouraging illicit sex a legitimate justification for dis-
qualifying a child's eligibility for AFDC; 15 second, that the paramount goal of
AFDC was the protection of dependent children;" 2 and finally, that Alabama,
in that its "substitute father" regulation defined the term "parent" in a manner
inconsistent with § 406(a) of the Social Security Act, breached its federally-im-
posed obligation to furnish AFDC to all eligible individuals.'53 No finding of
unconstitutionality was, therefore, necessary."" Clearly in this case, however, the
Alabama regulation in question looked to the moral conduct of the mother in
determining the eligibility of the children. Moreover, it appears possible that
the reasonable relationship test could have been used to strike down the regula-
tion. 55 But the Court shied away from deciding what type of behavior of a
parent, if any, should preclude the receipt of aid by his children, and, instead,
rested its decision on its construction of the federal and state statutes.
D. Moral and Economic Considerations
The new emphasis in conditions attached to welfare benefits is on rehabilita
tion, 56 and the big battle ahead is over what so-called rehabilitative conditions
are legally permissible. Though these rehabilitative conditions are largely eco-
nomic in that they are geared to getting recipients off the welfare rolls and on to
payrolls, there has been a good-deal of literature lately expressing a disdain for the
attempts of legislatures and welfare officials to impose moral codes upon welfare
recipients under the guise of economic rehabilitation."'
One of the classic examples illustrating the conditioning of welfare benefits
by a moral code is Wilkie v. O'Connor.' Wilkie was a rather eccentric in-
dividual who insisted that he had a right to sleep under an old barn, in a nest
of rags, access to which was possible only by crawling upon his hands and knees.
On hearing of Wilkie's peculiar sleeping habits, the Commissioner of Public
Welfare discontinued his old age assistance checks. An appeal that the old age
the alleged sexual behavior of the mother; such a reason is wholly unrelated to the
purpose of the Aid to Dependent Children statutes. Id. at 39.
150 392 U.S. at 312-13.
151 Id. at 325-27.
152 Id. at 325.
153 Id. at 333.
154 Id. at 313.
155 Justice Douglas, who concurred in the majority opinion, did resort to a constitutional
test. He thought that the decision should have been based upon -the grounds that the im-
morality of the mother had no rational connection with the needs of the children. Id. at 335.
156 See, e.g., Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF.,
L. Rxv. 479, 480-81, 492-97 (1966); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits
with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443, 449-60 (1966); Reich, Individual Rights and
Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, supra note 35, at 1246-57; Reich, The New
Property, supra note 35, at 747-58; and Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social
Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347, 1355-60 (1963).
157 Moral codes, in -the context of moral conditions attached to welfare benefits, refer to
the moral value judgments made by the legislature, i.e., that welfare recipieAts should not
misbehave sexually or, perhaps, that welfare recipients should work for a living like everyone
else.
158 261 App. Div. 373, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1941).
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assistance should not be withheld was denied and Wilide's argument that he had
a right to live as he pleased while being supported by public charity was re-
jected in these words:
One would admire his independence were he not so dependent, but he has
no right to defy the standards and conventions of civilized society while being
supported at public expense. This is true even though some of those
conventions may be somewhat artificial.159
The court went on to add:
It may possibly be true, as he says, that his health it not threatened by the
way he lives. After all he should not demand that the public, at its expense,
allow him to experiment with a manner of living which' is likely to en-
danger his health so that he will become a still greater expense to the
public.160
Actually, the court's rationale was based upon both a moral judgment and an
economic consideration. And while it may seem appalling for the court to have
denied Wilkie his old age assistance checks bemuse he dared defy the social
niceties of sleeping in a bed (the moral consideration), the fact that his unortho-
dox sleeping habits could so endanger his health that the state might well have
been called upon to pay any resulting medical bills (the economic consideration)
makes the decision much more palatable.
The same might be said of conditions attached to any welfare benefits.
There is, for instance, more relevance in making the inability to work a pre-
condition to AFDC benefits than there is in making good moral character a
prerequisite for eligibility. Since the ultimate purpose of AFDC is really to help
families who require temporary assistance to become self-supporting and inde-
pendent, it is difficult to attack the validity of any conditions imposed which
foster employment or employability of a parent with children on AFDC.'
Consider,, though, the validity'of a condition which requires a single-parent-
mother who is unemployed and able to work, or unemployable but able to be
trained, to work or take vocational training." 2 For the legislature to require her
to take work or work training in order to become or remain eligible for AFDC
involves, on its part, both a moral judgment and an economic consideration.
The moral judgment is tha single-parent-mothers ought to support their chil-
dren by working rather than remaining at home to care for them." The funda-
159 Id. at 375, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
160 Id.
161 Today every state which accepts federal AFDC matching funds must guarantee the
cooperation of its welfare department and public employment offices in seeking employment
for AFDC parents, promise that it will terminate AFDC aid to parents who refuse without
good cause to accept employment, and use its existing vocational education centers to make un-
employable parents employable. 75 Stat. 75 "(1961), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1964).
162 See, e.g., Stacy v. Ashland Co. Dep't of Public Welfare, 159 N.W."d 630, 635 (Wis.
1968) (holding that the Wisconsin Welfare Department could require a divorced mother of
two, trained as a nurse's aide under the Economic Opportuiiity Act, to accept employment
outside the home as a condition to receiving AFDC beneflis, without frustrating and pre-
venting the fulfillment of the welfare prdgram). _
163 The 1967 amendments to the Social Security 'Act, making day care available to
mothers with dependent children, are based upon the assumption that AFDC mothers have
been outside of the labor force too long and that 'if adequate day care facilities are made
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mental economic consideration is that the ultimate purpose of AFDC is to
financially help the families receiving aid until they can become self-supporting
and independent.""
The unconstitutional conditions test and the statutory construction test do
not apply in determining the validity of this condition. No choice is required
between AFDC or the loss of a constitutional right and there is no state statute
in the hypothethical which conflicts with a federal statute. The validity of the
condition must, therefore, be judged by the reasonable relationship test. If this
test were to be applied taking into account the economic consideration involved,
the court would most likely find the condition of employment or training to be
valid. Yet by considering the implicit moral judgment there might be some
doubt as to the validity of the condition. Since most of the current rehabilitative
conditions attached to welfare benefits have both economic and moral over-
tones, 6 ' the application of the reasonable relationship test would be especially
difficult to apply.'66 A court facing the economic and moral conflict in this type
of situation would be forced to balance the individual interest involved against
the public interest. The mother's interest as an individual is in choosing whether
to work and support her children, or to stay home and have the state support
them. The state's interest is in making the mother productive and self-supporting
instead of dependent upon welfare. Viewed in this context it is likely that the
court, in applying the reasonable relationship test, would uphold the validity of
the condition and strike the balance in favor of the public interest.
V. Conclusion
Any attempt to determine the nature of the legal rights of the needy to
public assistance must overcome many apparent obstacles before the precise legal
issues become clear. Initially, a distinction must be made between the issues
inherent in public welfare which the legal system is competent to handle and the
issues that can be resolved only by the legislature - a distinction between issues
of constitutional power and the wisdom of policy and adequacy of statutory
structures. Secondly, it must be recognized that whatever right exists to public
assistance, the context in which the right arises is fundamentally different from
our more traditional legal rights. However, once it is grasped that the legal
issues arise out of a conflict between the interest of the individual indigent person
in receiving public assistance with a minimum of interference with his personal
freedom, and the public interest, with its concern in both assisting the individual
needy person and in reducing the overall level of poverty in the nation, the legal
issues can be set out with some precision and constructively discussed.
available, they can, through training and other services, be able to care for themselves and
their families. See 1968 Manpower Report of the President 124.
164 See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
165 See the discussion regarding the imposition of moral standards on the poor in Reich,
Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, supra note 35, at 1245-47.
166 One author has commented that "[r]ationality is not something that the courts can
easily determine." O'Neil, supra note 156, at 468 (1966). He then lists a number of criteria to
help the courts, but admits that these criteria will probably make an application of the reason-
able relationship test even more difficult. See id. at 463-77.
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Since any right to public welfare assistance must be traced to a statute which
the legislature was under no legal compulsion to enact, the nature of the assistance
that is made available is largely a matter of legislative discretion, and not subject
to close judicial scrutiny. Consequently, the critical legal issue, and the issue
which has been the subject of a major portion of the recent litigation, is the
question of what conditions may constitutionally be imposed on eligibility for
public assistance. It is apparent from the decisions that there are three possible
tests which may be used to determine the validity of eligibility conditions for public
welfare: first, the unconstitutional conditions test, which requires that the con-
ditions placed on eligibility for public assistance must not force a person to
choose between the assistance and the free exercise of a constitutionally pro-
tected right; second, the reasonable relationship test, which requires that the
conditions placed on eligibility for assistance be reasonably related to the pur-
pose of the statute under which the assistance is made available; and, third, the
statutory construction test, which requires that state welfare statutes must be
consistent with the purposes of the controlling federal statute.
These three tests constitute a portion of what might be termed the doctrine
of statutory entitlement, which was- succinctly expressed by the district court in
King v. Smith:
[A]id to Dependent Childen financial assistance is a statutory entitlement
under both the laws of Alabama and the Federal Social Security Act,
and where the child meets the statutory eligibility requirements he has a
right to receive financial benefits under the program.167 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, a needy person has an enforceable right to financial assistance from the
government when he meets the statutory eligibility requirements of the
welfare program to which he applies. These eligibility requirements, in turn,
are the appropriate subject matter for judicial scrutiny via the application of
the three tests outlined in this Note.
James P. Cooney
H. David Prior
167 277 F. Supp. 31,38 (M.D. Ala. 1967), aff'd, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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